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Abstract
In this paper, we prove that two ﬁrms may prefer not to include a termination
clause in their partnership contract, thus inducing a costly termination in case of fail-
ure of the joint project. This ex-post ineﬃciency induces partners to exert large levels
of non-contractible eﬀorts (investments) in order to decrease the probability of fail-
ure. Therefore, the absence of a termination clause works as a “discipline device” that
mitigates the hold-up problem within the partnership. We show that writing a con-
tract without a termination clause is a credible commitment even when partners can
add such a clause in the contract in any moment of their relationship. Comparative
statics analysis suggests that contracts lacking a termination clause are suited to al-
liances in R&D, when partners are not rivals or when they have strong technological
complementarities.
J.E.L. codes: D82, K12, L24.
Keywords: hold-up; termination clauses; partnerships; joint ventures.
¤Paper presented at the 3rd IIO Conference (Atlanta, U.S.), at the Jornadas de Economia Industrial
(Bilbao, Spain), and at the CEPET Workshop (Udine, Italy). The seminar audiences at the Universities
of Milano-Cattolica, Trento and Udine are acknowledged. Authors wish to thank Mariagiovanna Baccara,
Sandeep Baliga, Marco Mariotti, Niko Matouschek, David P´ erez-Castrillo, Jos` e de Sousa and Kathryn Spier
for insightful discussions.
yCorresponding author: Dipartimento di Economia, Universit` a di Trento, Via Inama 5, 38100 Trento
(Italy). E-mail stefano.comino@economia.unitn.it, tel. +390461882221, fax +390461882222.
zDipartimento di Scienze Economiche ”M. Fanno”, Universit` a di Padova, Via del Santo 33, 35123 Padova
(Italy).
xDipartimento di Statistica, Universit` a degli Studi di Milano - Bicocca, Via Bicocca degli Arcimboldi, 8
- 20126 Milano
11 Introduction
Strategic alliances, in the form of joint ventures (JVs) or looser modes of cooperation, are an
increasingly popular solution in order to reduce start-up costs, share risks, enter new markets
or develop new technologies. According to Dyer et al. (2001) the top 500 global businesses
have an average of 60 major strategic alliances each. During the nineties, the number of
alliances has grown at an annual rate of over 25% in the leading industrial nations and about
20% of the revenue of the largest US and European corporations comes from partnerships
(see Contractor and Lorange, 2002 and Harbison et al., 2000).
Even though the potential advantages of partnering are well known, the track record for
joint ventures is not a glowing one. Instability is a commonly recognized problem aﬀecting
strategic alliances and the average life span of a JV is as little as four years (seven years for
other studies) with a failure rate ranging between 50 and 70%.1 Because of these prospects,
partners should be aware of the diﬃculties they may encounter in managing an alliance and
of the possibility of its early termination, when setting up a new relation. According to some
commentators, partners should approach JVs as Hollywood marriages; they should plan their
termination strategy from the very beginning by specifying in the initial agreement “what
happens to assets, customers and existing contracts in the (likely) event of a break-up”.2
Indeed, as it is well documented in the business literature, a non-amicable termination of an
alliance may result in very long negotiations, large expenses and bitter legal battles.3
Surprisingly, JV participants devote relatively little attention to predict what happens
in case of termination of the alliance. A PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000) survey shows that
less than half of the ﬁrms entering an alliance have a formal exit strategy. Similarly, sev-
eral authors have observed that of the many aspects of alliance management, planning its
termination ranks among the most ignored by partners.4 Obviously, various might be the
reasons for such a lack. Just as a pre-nuptial agreement, discussing a termination clause
when forming the alliance might sour the deal; it might reveal the lack of trust of part-
ners. In addition, also diﬃculties in working out the various possible contingencies that
might occur and designing what parties should do in these cases may justify the absence
of a termination clause in a JV contract. A possible alternative explanation for such an
absence can be envisaged in the case of Concert. When negotiating the terms of their joint
venture (called Concert), British Telecommunications and AT&T explicitly decided not to
include a termination clause. By not determining the rules for separation, partners wanted
to demonstrate their commitment into the relationship.5
The model we present develops formally this idea. We consider two ﬁrms that set
1These ﬁgures are taken from Gonzalez (2001) and Inpken and Ross (2001).
2“Joint Ventures: Getting out Without Being Hurt” by A. Maitland, Financial Times 10th October,
2002.
3This point has been raised in many of the papers we are quoting in this section; see, for instance,
Gonzalez (2001).
4We refer, among many others, to Roussel (2001) and Chi and Seth (2002).
5“Joint Ventures: Getting out Without Being Hurt”, Financial Times 10th October, 2002.
2up a joint venture to pursue a joint project.6 After signing the JV-contract, ﬁrms non-
cooperatively choose the levels of eﬀort (investment) to exert. These eﬀorts (investments)
determine the likelihood of success/failure of the joint project and we assume that they are
non-contractible.7 In case of failure of the project ﬁrms terminate the partnership and decide
upon the allocation of the assets belonging to the JV. If the JV-contract regulates the terms
for termination then assets allotment takes place at zero cost. On the contrary, absent a
termination clause, partners start a (costly) bargaining process to assign the ownership of
the assets. We assume that partners have the possibility of reaching an amicable settlement
and, in case they fail to agree, they come up before a Court which takes the ﬁnal decision.
We show that in equilibrium partners do go to Court with positive probability and bear the
related legal expenses thus making the bargaining costly due to the related legal expenses.8
The main result of our paper is that, under some circumstances, it is rational not to include
a termination clause in the JV-contract. The intuition for this result is simple; by not includ-
ing the clause, partners worsen their own prospects in the event of failure of the project: not
only they do not succeed in pursuing their project but they also generate a costly bargaining
process due to litigation before the Court. This induces partners to exert larger eﬀorts (non
contractible investments). In other words, the absence of a termination clause works as a
“discipline device” that alleviates the hold-up problem.
The crucial aspect when committing to a device that induces a costly bargaining relates
to the credibility of the commitment itself. In our paper, asymmetric information makes the
absence of a termination clause a credible commitment. Following the argument put forward
by several authors,9 we assume that partners are asymmetrically informed about the assets’
value. In particular, we assume that only one ﬁrm observes how much the assets worth; the
attempt of this ﬁrm to appropriate most of the surplus during the bargaining stage induces
the partner to reject an amicable settlement with positive probability so that ﬁrms resort to
Court for the allotment of the assets.10
6In this paper we focus on the strategic eﬀects of contract clauses when parties start a partnership, in
particular the eﬀect of termination clauses on the partners’ behavior. However, here we will not analyze in
details why parties want to form a partnership, neither the reason why partners decide to form a partnership
instead of choosing diﬀerent organizational forms.
7Several papers, both empirical as well as theoretical ones, have highlighted the presence and the con-
sequences of the non-contractible nature of (at least part of) partners’ contributions (see Morasch, 1995
P´ erez-Castrillo and Sandon´ ıs, 1996, Tao and Wu, 1997 and Veugelers, 1993). For instance, the “quality” of
the researchers or labs that partners agree to assign to the JV is very diﬃcult to be speciﬁed in a contract.
These variables might be observable by partners while cooperating in the joint venture, but they might not
be veriﬁable in a court and therefore not contractible.
8In principle, bargaining might be costly because of various reasons: the time spent by partners haggling
over the terms of the agreement or the payments to experts/arbitrators needed for evaluating the assets. In
the model, we focus on this second aspect.
9See for instance Chi and Seth (2002).
10The eﬀect of private information on the design of the optimal property rights has a long tradition that
stems from the seminal papers by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975) and the fundamental works by Hart
and Moore on incomplete contracts and hold-up problems (see, for instance, Hart and Moore, 1999). More
recently, Matouschek (2004) has formalized the idea that the ownership structure should be tailored in order
to minimize the size of ex-post ineﬃciencies caused by private information.
3Review of the relevant literature
There are diﬀerent strands of the economic literature that are related to our paper. The
idea that the absence of a termination clause mitigates the hold-up problem is in line with
the “resource commitment” argument put forward in the business literature.11 It is argued
that by devoting substantial resources to the partnership, ﬁrms increase their level of in-
volvement and therefore they reduce the advantages of behaving opportunistically. Resource
commitment can be achieved in various ways. The governance form of the alliance is one
possible way and, in this respect, equity alliances are considered to require greater levels
of ﬁnancial as well as organizational commitment than non-equity ones. The exchange of
“mutual hostages” is another way to increase commitment and therefore to stabilize the
alliance; by bringing some critical assets (the hostages) to the partnership, parties become
more vulnerable and therefore less prone to behave in an opportunistic manner.12 Therefore,
with reference to this strand of literature, we claim that the absence of a termination clause
is a further way in which resource commitment can be obtained.
A relatively recent literature stemming from the paper of Cramton, Gibbons and Klem-
perer (1987) focuses on partnership dissolution; two are the main issues that are tackled:
i) under what conditions there is eﬃcient partnership dissolution (i.e. dissolve it when it
is eﬃcient to do so and assign the assets to the partner that evaluates them the most)?13
ii) what are the relative merits of commonly used dissolution clauses such as the so-called
Texas-shootout? 14 Our paper departs from this literature quite substantially. We consider
the relation between the eﬀort (investment) decision made by the partners and the possible
termination of the alliance while the existing literature on partnership dissolution focuses
exclusively on the break-up decision.15 Moreover, we show that under some circumstances
it is rational to induce a costly bargaining by not regulating the terms for the break-up even
in case a simple termination clause would induce an eﬃcient termination decision.
The idea that it might be beneﬁcial to improve ex-ante eﬃciency (in our paper, larger
eﬀort/investment) by imposing some ineﬃciencies ex-post (in our paper, costly bargaining)
through the absence of a termination clause is similar to the one presented in a quite diﬀerent
context by Bordignon and Brusco (2001). These authors show that the lack of exit rules in
federal constitutions can be a commitment device; high costs of secessions (secessions are
11The literature on “resource commitment” in strategic alliances is extremely vast. A comprehensive and
neat discussion on this issue can be found in Buckley and Casson (1988) and Das and Rahman (2002).
12Williamson (1983) discusses the use of mutual hostages positions as means to stabilize relationships. For
an application to joint ventures see Buckley and Casson (1988), Das and Rahman (2002) and Kogut (1989).
13See Fiesler, Kittsteiner and Moldovanu (2003) and McAfee (1992).
14In a Texas-shootout the procedure to assign the assets is such that one partner announces a price and
the counterpart chooses whether to be the buyer or the seller of the assets. See Brooks and Spier (2004) and
De Frutos and Kittsteiner (2004) for recent contributions on this topic.
15One relevant exception is represented by Li and Wolfstetter (2004) who consider both partners’ con-
tributions and possible termination of the JV. The fundamental diﬀerence with our paper and that of Li
and Wolfstetter is related to the assumption about the contractibility of partners’ contributions. While we
assume that they are not contractible, Li and Wolfstetter assume that they are so that no hold-up problem
arises.
4possible only by “independence wars”) increase the stability of the federation, and therefore
the ex-ante beneﬁts of joining it. Even though the underlying idea is the same, the two
papers diﬀer for at least two fundamental aspects. First in Bordignon and Brusco (2001) the
lack of exit rules is a credible commitment to an ex-post ineﬃciency (i.e. it is renegotiation-
proof) only if there exists a positive cost of renegotiation. Contrarily, in our paper the
contract without termination clause induces an ex-post ineﬃciency even though partners
are allowed to reach an amicable (i.e. with no renegotiation cost) settlement. Second, in
Bordignon and Brusco (2001) parties never litigate in equilibrium (there is never secession
by an independence war). However, we want to explain why in reality we observe not only
contracts without termination clauses, but also partnerships which terminate with costly
litigations in front of Courts.
Our paper is also related to the stream of literature which takes into consideration strate-
gic reasons for contract incompleteness. Non-contigent contracts as a signaling/screening
device are analyzed in Aghion and Bolton (1987), Diamond (1993), Hermalin (2001), Nicol` o
and Tedeschi (2005) and Spier’s (1992). Bernheim and Whinston (1998) show that contracts
which contain some “gaps” may help in establishing the appropriate incentives for parties.
In a context where certain actions are observable by parties but not veriﬁable by Courts,
then incomplete contracts that expand the set of discretionary choices/strategies may be
used in order to induce parties to coordinate on Pareto superior equilibria.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the set-up to the model.
In Section 3, we derive the main results of the paper and some empirical implications of
the theoretical analysis. Our model suggests that contracts lacking a termination clause
are suited to alliances in R&D, when partners are not rivals or when they have strong
technological complementarities. Section 4 is devoted to check the robustness of our result
while in Section 5 a concluding discussion is presented. All the proofs that are not essential
for a clear understanding of the main arguments of the paper are presented in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Two ﬁrms, ﬁrm 1 and 2, form a partnership to pursue a joint project. The project is a
risky activity with two possible outcomes: good, i.e. the project is successful, or bad, i.e.
the project fails. The good outcome occurs with probability p(k1;k2) 2 [0;1] while the
bad one with complementary probability; ki ¸ 0 represents the investment level chosen by
partner i = 1;2 and ci(k1;k2) is the corresponding private cost. At an intermediate stage
of the project, after the investment levels have been chosen, ﬁrms observe a perfect signal
of the future outcome, µ 2 fµG;µBg, where µj stands for the signal of outcome j; and may
decide whether to continue or to terminate the partnership. When µ = µG (where G stays
for “good”) ﬁrms know that the project will generate a monetary value vG = v provided
that the partnership is continued and 0 in case of early termination at the intermediate
stage. When µ = µB (where B stays for “bad”) they know that the project will generate a
monetary value vB = 0.
5Firms’ collaboration generates some intermediate result which is incorporated in an in-
divisible asset A. If ﬁrms choose to continue the partnership then the asset is devoted to the
joint project. If ﬁrms decide for an early termination of the partnership the asset can be ac-
quired by one of them and used for its own business. We assume that the asset has a positive
private value for one ﬁrm only, that is either '1 = 0 and '2 > 0 or '1 > 0 and '2 = 0; and
that the two events occur with equal probability independently from the realization of the
outcome or the investment levels.16 Moreover, we assume that when the private evaluation
of ﬁrm i = 1;2 is positive, it can take value 'i 2
©
'H;'Lª
with 'H > 'L > 0 and that each
realization is equally likely and independent from the outcome or the investment levels. In
what follows we let E['] ´
'H+'L
2 .
Information structure and timing
We assume that the signal µ and the investment levels ki, i = 1;2, are observed by both
ﬁrms even though they are not veriﬁable, that is, non-observable by third parties. The only
source of asymmetric information between the two ﬁrms relies on the private value of the
asset, since ﬁrm i for which 'i = 0 does not observe whether the counterpart’s private value
is 'H or 'L.
The timing of the game is as follows
At time t = 0 partners decide upon the terms of their partnership contract. The contract
speciﬁes how ﬁrms share the monetary value generated by the project and might include a
termination clause; this last clause determines who has the right to terminate the partner-
ship and the rules for allocating the asset A. The cost of writing and modifying the contract
is ﬁxed and equal to ", which is positive but arbitrarily small.17 After agreeing on the terms
of the contract, partners simultaneously choose the investment levels.
At time t = 1, ﬁrms observe the signal µ and decide whether to continue or to terminate
the partnership and, in the latter case, about the allocation of the asset A, in accordance
with the contract clauses. If the contract does not contain a termination clause, the com-
mercial law determines the rules for terminating the partnership while asset allocation is
left to ex-post bargaining between parties. If parties do not reach an agreement during the
bargaining stage, they resort to Court which veriﬁes the value of the asset and decides how to
split this value and the overall legal expenses 2F between the two partners (we will be more
detailed on the Court rules in section 3.2.2). We assume that the Court can verify (estimate)
the value of A and the monetary value of the project, but it cannot observe neither the levels
of investment, nor the signal. We interpret the legal expenses 2F as the cost of assessment
16Note that the assumption that the asset A is worthless for one of the two partners, implies that its
market value is nought.
17We are interested in showing that partners can choose not to write a termination clause even when the
cost of writing it is negligible, otherwise there are obvious reasons why contracts do not include termination
clauses.
6(veriﬁcation) of the asset value by means of independent experts employed by the Court.18
At time t = 2 the monetary or private values are realized.
Throughout the paper we will assume that the following conditions are met:
(A1) v > 'H and 'L > 2F > 0;
(A2) 'H ¡ 'L ¸ 2F;
The ﬁrst inequality in (A1) implies that it is eﬃcient to continue the partnership when
µ = µG while the second implies both that termination is eﬃcient when µ = µB and that
ﬁrms are better-oﬀ going to Court to allocate the asset rather than disposing of it when they
do not reach an agreement in the bargaining stage. Condition (A2) requires the two possible
positive private values of the asset to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. In particular, it guarantees
that during the bargaining stage there is a meaningful asymmetry of information between
partners so that the proposer of the settlement has incentives in some circumstances to cheat
and try to appropriate most of the surplus of the relationship.
In order to derive a closed-form solution for the model, in Section 3 we employ spe-
ciﬁc functional forms for the probability and cost functions. Namely, we assume that
p(k1;k2) = minf´ (k1 + k2);1g and ci(k1;k2) =
°k2
i
2 for i = 1;2: Moreover we assume that °
is suﬃciently high and ´ suﬃciently small to prevent partners to choose so large investment
levels as to induce µ = µG with probability 1.19
The set of contracts
We denote with C the set of all possible contracts that can be chosen at time t = 0 by the
two ﬁrms. In turn, a contract is a set of clauses which contains some or all of the following
provisions:
(i) the share s 2 [0;1] of the monetary value that ﬁrm 1 receives at time t = 2 when the
project is continued (and (1 ¡ s) is the share of ﬁrm 2);
(ii) an indicator function d that speciﬁes which ﬁrm has the right to terminate the partner-
ship: d = i if ﬁrm i only has this right with i = 1 or 2, d = 1 _ 2 if each ﬁrm is entitled to
terminate the partnership unilaterally, and ﬁnally d = 1 ^2 if termination requires unanim-
ity;
(iii) the price b ¸ 0 at which the asset can be acquired/sold in case of early termination of
the partnership;
(iv) an indicator function f; such that if f = i; with i = 1 or 2, then partner i is entitled to
choose whether to be the buyer or the seller of the asset at price b:
We call complete a contract that speciﬁes all these four elements.
18Namely, we assume that the cost of observing the private value of the asset is the same for the partner
and the court. It could be objected that usually a ﬁrm can better estimate the partner’s asset value than
an external court. Nevertheless, a court have enforcing powers (for instance it can force a party to show the
account books) which might reduce the cost of assessment.
19Relaxing this condition complicates the presentation of the results substantially without adding any
interesting new insight.
73 Results
3.1 Benchmark: First Best Contract with Veriﬁable Investments
When investment levels are veriﬁable, then ﬁrms are able to draw the ﬁrst best contract that
induces eﬃcient decisions both ex-post, at t = 1 once ﬁrms have observed the signal µ; as
well as ex-ante, at t = 0; when they are uncertain about the success of the project.
From condition (A1), it follows that ex-post decisions are eﬃcient if and only if:
(1) the partnership is continued, in case µ = µG;
(2) the partnership is terminated and the asset is assigned to ﬁrm 1 if '1 > 0 and to ﬁrm 2
otherwise, in case µ = µB.
The next couple of lemmata characterize the contractual provisions that induce ex-post
eﬃciency. Lemma 1 states that the price b at which the asset can be acquired or sold cannot
be too large in order to have always the eﬃcient allotment of A. In fact, if b is very large
then the ﬁrm entitled to take the buy/sell decision might choose to sell the asset even when
it assigns a positive private evaluation to it, thus leading to an ineﬃcient allotment.
Lemma 1 Once termination has been decided, then a complete contract induces eﬃcient







Proof. See the Appendix.






ensures the eﬃcient allotment of A both when f = 1 or f = 2:
The next lemma states the conditions which induce the eﬃcient continuation/termination
decision and shows that they depend on how the rights to end the partnership are speciﬁed.
Lemma 2 A contract with eﬃcient allotment of the asset A, induces an eﬃcient decision
about the termination of the partnership if and only if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) if d = 1; then sv ¸ 'H ¡ b;
(ii) if d = 2; then (1 ¡ s)v ¸ 'H ¡ b;
(iii) if d = 1 _ 2 then sv ¸ 'H ¡ b and (1 ¡ s)v ¸ 'H ¡ b;
(iv) if d = 1 ^ 2; then the decision is always eﬃcient.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 2 speciﬁes the contractual provisions that induce ﬁrms to continue their partner-
ship when µ = µG: In particular, it ensures that the ﬁrm who has the right to terminate the
partnership obtains a greater pay-oﬀ by choosing continuation when the observed signal is
µG: In turn, eﬃcient termination, that is termination in case µ = µB; follows from Lemma 1
that guarantees an eﬃcient allotment of the asset; indeed, when µ = µB by continuing both
partners obtain zero while by terminating they both obtain a non-negative pay-oﬀ.
Ex-ante eﬃciency is obtained when investments are chosen in order to maximize the joint
expected pay-oﬀ of the two ﬁrms. Proposition 1 deﬁnes the contractual provisions of the
ﬁrst best contract.
8Proposition 1 When investments are veriﬁable, then ﬁrms can sign the ﬁrst best contract
that speciﬁes:
i) b as deﬁned in Lemma 1;
ii) d and s as deﬁned in Lemma 2;
iii) f = 1 or f = 2;
iv) the investment levels ki = kFB =
(v¡E['])´
° ; for i = 1;2:
Proof. The contractual provisions speciﬁed in Lemmata 1 and 2 guarantee ex-post
eﬃciency. Therefore, ex-ante eﬃciency requires investments to solve the following program :
max
fk1;k2g









From the ﬁrst order conditions it follows that the eﬃcient level of investment is kFB
i =
(v¡E['])´
° with i = 1;2:
3.2 Non Veriﬁable Investments
When investments are not veriﬁable, then an hold-up problem arises. Firms are not able
to contract on the investment levels, which in equilibrium must be incentive compatible. In
what follows we ﬁrst deﬁne the second best contract in the class of complete contracts that
induce ex-post eﬃciency. Afterwords, we consider contracts that do not include a termination
clause and we study whether by sacriﬁcing ex-post eﬃciency ﬁrms are able to mitigate the
hold-up problem and increase their expected pay-oﬀs.
3.2.1 Ex-post Eﬃcient Complete Contracts (C-Contract)
In this section, we focus on complete contracts that induce ex-post eﬃciency, that is, con-
tracts that include all the four provisions s;d;b;f described in Section 2 and such that
Lemmata 1 and 2 are satisﬁed. We denote with Cepeff ½ C such set of contracts.
The next proposition characterizes the second best contract in the Cepeff set; namely,
the contract that induces partners to choose the levels of investment that maximize their
joint pay-oﬀ under the incentive compatibility constraint.
Proposition 2 The second best contract in the set Cepeff provides that s = 1
2. The equilib-





Proof. See the Appendix.
The above result can be easily understood. Each ﬁrm has the same probability of being
the buyer ('i > 0) or the seller ('i = 0) of the asset in case of termination of the partnership.
Therefore, in case µ = µB the two ﬁrms obtain the same expected pay-oﬀ. Given the
convexity of the cost function, then it is optimal to share equally the pay-oﬀ also in case
9µ = µG. The reason is that in a symmetric model equal sharing of the revenues gives to
the partners the same incentives to invest. Therefore it induces equal investment levels for
the two ﬁrms, minimizing total costs for given level of total investment. Simple comparison
between Propositions 1 and 2 highlights that partners underinvest.
3.2.2 Contracts with no Termination Clauses (NC-Contract)
In this section, we focus on the set of incomplete contracts which do not include a termination
clause; that is, contracts which specify only s: We denote this set CNC ½ C. Even though
the contract is silent about d;b; and f, some provisions are regulated by the relevant laws by
default. in particular, the commercial law speciﬁes whether partnership termination can be
unilaterally decided by each party, or decided by unanimity; in what follows we assume that
unanimity is required.20 However, usually the law does not establish how the asset will be
assigned, that is, who will get the asset and how much it has to pay for it. We assume that
once the partnership has been terminated, ﬁrms bargain over the allocation of A. Without
loss of generality, in what follows we refer to 1 as the ﬁrm for which the asset has a positive
value, that is, '1 2
©
'H;'Lª
and '2 = 0.
Bargaining over Asset Ownership
We assume that the bargaining stage is as follows. Firm 1, observes the private value of
the asset '1 2
©
'H;'Lª
and thereafter proposes a trading price ¼ at which it is willing to
buy A. The cost of making the proposal is ": Partner 2 can either accept or reject the oﬀer.
In case of acceptance, the terms of the proposal are enforced. In case of rejection ﬁrms go
to Court. We assume that the Court uses the following rules.
The Court’s Rules
The Court veriﬁes the value of the asset (i.e. ﬁrm 1’s evaluation) and then decides about:
(i) the allotment of A, (ii) the compensation for the seller and (iii) the division of the legal
expenses 2F. We assume that the Court decision is eﬃcient, that is, it assigns A to ﬁrm 1.
Moreover, it compels ﬁrm 1 to pay the fair price (i.e. half of the value of the asset) to ﬁrm 2.
Finally, Court allocates the legal expenses 2F adopting a fee-shifting rule based on pre-trial
proposals. Namely, 2F is equally shared unless ﬁrm 1 oﬀered a price ¼ smaller than the fair
one; in this latter case, the whole legal expenses are charged to ﬁrm 1.21
20It can be shown that our results are not altered if unilateral termination is speciﬁed in the commercial
law.
21Fee-shifting rules are used in many legislations (as Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures in the
United States). These rules give strong incentives to parties in order to reach an amicable agreement thus
avoiding costly litigations in front of the court. Indeed, Spier (1994) proves that “if litigants are asymetrically
informed about the merits of the case, then fee shifting rules that are based upon the settlement oﬀers made
before the trial have powerful incentive properties”. Therefore they are the most unfovourable rules in order
to prove that partners may fail to reach an amicable agreement before going to the court.
10With a little abuse of notation, we let 'k denote ﬁrm 1’s type when it observes that the
asset value is 'k, with k 2 fH;Lg: Moreover, we let ¹(¼) be the probability that ﬁrm 2
assigns to the event “ﬁrm 1 is of type 'H” after receiving an oﬀer ¼: The next proposition
characterizes the equilibrium of the bargaining game.
Proposition 3 The unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the bargaining game which sat-
isﬁes the divinity criterion D1 is the following:
² ﬁrm 1:
– type 'L oﬀers
'L
2 ;
– type 'H oﬀers
'L
2 with probability ® and
'H




– if ¼ ¸
'H
2 it accepts the oﬀer;
– if
'L
2 < ¼ <
'H
2 it rejects the oﬀer;
– if ¼ =
'L
2 it accepts the oﬀer with probability ¯ and it rejects it with probability
(1 ¡ ¯); where ¯ = 4F
4F+('H¡'L);
– if ¼ <
'L
2 it rejects the oﬀer;
² beliefs:
– if ¼ 6=
'L
2 , then ﬁrm 2 believes that ¹(¼) = 1;
– if ¼ =
'L
2 , then ﬁrm 2 believes that ¹(¼) = ®
1+®:
Proof. See the Appendix.
As Proposition 3 shows the equilibrium of the bargaining game is semi-separating. Type
'L makes the fair oﬀer while type 'H plays mixed strategies: with probability (1 ¡ ®) it
makes the fair proposal and with complementary probability it mimics the other type in





2 is oﬀered it randomizes between accepting and rejecting the proposal. This
last fact implies that in equilibrium there is a positive probability that a proposal is rejected
and therefore the following result holds.
Corollary 1 If ﬁrms sign an incomplete contract, in case the joint project fails, with positive
probability parties solve their dispute in front of the Court; when this happens, there is an
ex-post ineﬃciency: in order to assign the asset parties incur an additional cost 2F; that is,
the legal expenses.
11The equilibrium characterized in Proposition 3 is the only one which satisﬁes the divinity
criterion D1. Given that we will repeatedly employ this reﬁnement, it is worth giving an
informal intuition of how it works. Consider that ﬁrm 1 makes an out-of-equilibrium proposal
and consider any conjecture that this ﬁrm has about how the partner reacts. If it happens
that, given any conjecture, type 'H ﬁnds it optimal to deviate whenever it is optimal for
type 'L while the opposite does not hold, then the D1 criterion imposes to assign probability
1 that the proposer is of type 'H. Loosely speaking, type 'H values the asset the most and
therefore it is also the one which would obtain the largest beneﬁt in case of acceptance of
an out-of-equilibrium proposal. Hence, only type 'H has an interest in making an out-of-
equilibrium proposal for a suﬃciently small probability of acceptance.
The Second-best NC-Contract
Given the equilibrium at the bargaining stage we can characterize the second-best con-
tract in the set CNC.
Proposition 4 The second best contract in the set CNC provides that s = 1
2. The equilibrium













; with i = 1;2:
Proof. See the Appendix.
The second best contract provides for an equal sharing of the monetary values generated
by the project also in this case, in analogy with Proposition 2.
3.3 The Choice of the Contract
We can now compare the performances of the complete and incomplete contracts that we
have considered in the previous sections. The following result shows that, under some circum-
stances, the incomplete contract deﬁned in Proposition 4 outperforms in terms of eﬃciency
any complete and ex-post eﬃcient contract.







4F + 'H ¡ 'L +
2°
3´2:
Proof. The result is obtained by comparing the joint pay-oﬀ that partners obtain under
the contracts deﬁned in Propositions 2 and 4 exploiting the fact that " is negligible.
Compared with a complete and ex-post eﬃcient contract, the eﬀect of not including a
termination clause in the initial agreement is twofold. On the one hand, it induces an ex-post
ineﬃciency given that with a positive probability ﬁrms will litigate in front of the Court in
order to assign the asset in case of partnership termination. On the other hand, the absence
12of a termination clause has also an incentive eﬀect. The ineﬃciency due to litigation reduces
the expected pay-oﬀ in case of failure of the project and this fact induces partners to make
larger investments in order to avoid this occurrence: This second eﬀect emerges by a simple
comparison of the equilibrium investment levels deﬁned in Propositions 2 and 4.22 The main
message of the above result is that it might be rational for ﬁrms to write an incomplete
contract which will be completed in front of the Court, bearing the litigation costs. Costly
litigation, induced by the absence of a termination clause, works as a “discipline device” that
mitigates the hold-up problem induced by the non-contractibility of the investment levels.
3.4 Comparative Statics and Empirical Implications
Conditions that make it more likely that the incomplete contract Pareto dominates the com-
plete one can be derived simply by inspecting the threshold value for v shown in Proposition
5: as the threshold shrinks the incomplete contract becomes more likely to be chosen. The
following corollary follows from simple diﬀerentiation of the threshold level with respect to
the various parameters of the model.
Corollary 2 The set of parameters for which the second-best incomplete contract Pareto




and ´; and (ii) decreases of ° and E['].
Proof. Follows form simple diﬀerentiation of the threshold level for v deﬁned in Propo-
sition 5.
The intuition for the above result follows from considering the twofold eﬀect of the lack
of a termination clause: ex-post ineﬃciency and greater incentives to invest. The eﬀect of ¡
'H ¡ 'L¢
and F is similar. It can be shown that larger levels of
¡
'H ¡ 'L¢
or F increase the
expected cost of litigation in the equilibrium of the bargaining game.23 In turn, this larger
ex-post ineﬃciency also implies that the incomplete contract is more eﬀective in terms of
increasing the incentives to invest. Under the speciﬁcation of our model the latter eﬀect
dominates.
Changes in °; ´ and E['] do not alter the ex-post ineﬃciency while they have an impact on
the optimal investment levels. By comparing kFB
i and kC
i one can show that the diﬀerence24
between the two is decreasing in ° and E['] and increasing in ´. Hence, the under-investment
problem of the complete contract is less severe when ° and E['] are large and ´ small. Indeed,
in these cases the marginal cost of the investment is large (° high), its marginal productivity
is small (´ low) and an enhanced level of E['] makes the eﬀect of the project failure less
severe.
22In both cases the investment is lower than the eﬃcient one; see Proposition 1.
23Conditional on the partnership termination, the expected cost of litigation is equal to the legal expenses,
2F; times the probability of litigation, 1







2° and therefore the under-investment that characterizes






Following from the above comparative statics analysis it is now possible to suggest some
testable implications predicted by the model.
R&D vs Production/Marketing partnerships The nature of partners’ contributions
as well as that of the asset A are determinant for the choice of the partnership contract. The
hold-up problem due to the non-veriﬁability of investments is more likely to be relevant in
case partners’ contributions have an intangible nature (e.g. know-how or tacit knowledge)
so that they are more diﬃcult to be contracted upon; in this case we expect the incomplete
contract to perform better than the complete one. Moreover, the eﬀectiveness of an incom-




in Corollary 2. Also in this case the nature of the asset is relevant. Indeed, it seems reason-
able to believe that an intangible asset such as a trademark or a patent might have a very
large private value ('H) or a very low one ('L) depending on the conditions under which
it is employed. On the contrary for a tangible asset such as equipment or machinery the




to be greater in case A is an intangible rather than a tangible asset.
The above discussion suggests that the incomplete contract might be more or less suited
depending on the “partnership agenda”. R&D alliances are more likely to involve intangible
contributions and assets rather than production or marketing ones; therefore, our model
predicts that R&D alliances are more likely to sign a contract without a termination clause.
Rival Partners P´ erez-Castrillo and Sandon´ ıs (1996) and Pastor and Sandon´ ıs (2002) point
out that the disclosure/provision of (non-contractible) know-how has an higher opportunity
cost when the partnership is between rivals: by disclosing information a ﬁrm makes the part-
ner a stronger competitor in the product market. Interpreting ci(k1;k2) as the opportunity
cost for ﬁrm i to provide ki, then ° is larger when partners are competitors; therefore, an
empirical implication of our model stemming from Corollary 2 is that partnerships between
rival ﬁrms are more likely to be governed by complete contracts.
Riskiness of the Project Often the literature on contracts analyzes the eﬀects of an
increasing risk on the investment levels and on the choice of the contract. In this model
there are two problems in addressing this issue: 1) increasing risk, per se, should not aﬀect
the behavior of risk neutral agents; 2) it is not clear what increasing risk means in our set-
up, since the probability of project success is endogenous (it depends on the choice of the
investment levels and, more generally, on the choice of the contract).
Let’s start with the second problem. The sum of partners’ revenue can take value 'L,
'H or v. One way of analyzing the eﬀect of riskiness is to compare, for ﬁxed levels of
investments, two projects, 1 and 2, such that the second is a mean-preserving-spread of
the ﬁrst, with the following characteristics: 'k
1 > 'k





2; where the subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the projects. Clearly, these assumptions imply
14that E['1] > E['2]; and, since we are assuming that the two projects generate the same
expected revenues, it follows that it has to be v1 < v2. By Propositions 5 and 2, we have
that the investment levels are larger in case of project 2 both under the incomplete and the
complete contracts. On top of that, when project 2 is carried out by the partnership then it
is more likely that the incomplete contract Pareto dominates the other. Therefore, a higher
risk aﬀects risk neutral agents’ behavior since it increases the expected marginal revenue of
an extra-unit of investment; moreover the incentive eﬀects on investment are stronger with
the contract without the termination clause.
The empirical prediction that follows from this analysis is that incomplete contracts are
more likely to rule partnerships carrying out riskier projects, like, again, R&D partnerships,
and more generally all those alliances where the diﬀerence between the revenues in case of
success and failure is large.
Complementarities between investments The assumptions made in the preceding sec-
tions about the speciﬁc form of the probability and the cost function imply that the best
response of each ﬁrm when choosing its investment level does not depend on the partner’s
choice. In fact, the marginal productivity and marginal cost of the investment are indepen-
dent from the other’s choice. Assume for instance that:
p(k1;k2) = minf´ (k1 + k2 + ±k1k2);1g
where ± ¸ 0 is a measure of the complementarity of the investment levels. Choosing this
functional form for the probability only aﬀects the investment levels both under the complete
and incomplete contracts. The main eﬀects of ± are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose that p(k1;k2) = minf´ (k1 + k2 + ±k1k2);1g, then the following
result hold:
1) The second best investment levels induced by both contracts, that with a termination clause
and that without it, increase;
2) The investment is higher and increases at a higher rate with ± in the contract without the
termination clause
3) The set of the other parameter values for which the contract without the termination clause
is preferred enlarges as ± increases.
4) The comparative statics with respect to the other parameters is qualitatively identical to
that of the model without complementarities, i.e., the set of parameters for which the second-
best incomplete contract Pareto dominates any ex-post eﬃcient complete contract enlarges
with i) increases of v,
¡
'H ¡ 'L¢
, F and ´; and (ii) decreases of ° and E[']
Proof. See the Appendix.
The empirical implication stemming from the above proposition is that alliances where
the technological complementarities of partners are strong (± large) tend to be governed by
incomplete partnership contracts.25
25Technological complementarities are typically high in R&D activities in the aircraft industry or in de-
velopment of military equipment, see Pastor and Sandon´ ıs (2002).
154 Robustness of the Results
4.1 Complete Contracts with ex-post Ineﬃciencies
In Section 3 we have restricted our analysis to the comparison between ex-post eﬃcient
contracts and contracts without a termination clause. In principle, partners might enhance
investment incentives also by writing complete contracts that induce some other kinds of ex-
post ineﬃciency than litigation in front of the Court. In particular, by inducing continuation
when µ = µB or by assigning the asset to the “wrong” ﬁrm (i.e. to the ﬁrm for which 'i = 0),
partners reduce their expected pay-oﬀ in case of failure of the project in the same manner as
in the contract without a termination clause. However, the following proposition shows that
ex-post ineﬃcient complete contracts are either eﬃciently renegotiated by partners at time
t = 1 or they are Pareto dominated by the complete contract deﬁned in Proposition 2.26
Proposition 7 Any complete contract that induces some ineﬃciency at t = 1 is either
(i) eﬃciently renegotiated; that is there exists a new contract in the set Cepeff that both ﬁrms
agree to sign at time t = 1; or
(ii) it is Pareto dominated by the contract deﬁned in Proposition 2.
Proof. See Appendix.
An ineﬃcient clause is a credible commitment only if at least one of the partners rejects
all the renegotiation proposals. In the proof we show that (i) when a complete contract
induces ineﬃcient allotment of the asset or ineﬃcient continuation (that is continuation
when µ = µB); the informed ﬁrm beneﬁts from making a (ex-post eﬃcient) proposal that the
partner accepts; (ii) contracts which induce ineﬃcient termination (i.e. termination when
µ = µG) with positive probability can be renegotiation-proof. However, partners never draw
these contracts since they induce an even lower level of investments than kC
i ; and therefore
they are Pareto dominated by the second-best complete contract.
4.2 Renegotiation between t = 0 and t = 1
So far we have allowed partners to “complete” (i.e. agree upon a price for the asset A)
their NC-contract only once the partnership has been terminated. However, in principle,
renegotiation could take place at other points in time. In particular, after having chosen the
level of investment and before observing µ (i.e. after t = 0 and before t = 1) partners do not
face the hold-up problem any longer and therefore it would be eﬃcient for them to agree on
a termination clause in order to avoid the possible costly litigation.
However, in Proposition 8 we show that if there exists a positive (inﬁnitely small) prob-
ability that, between t = 0 and t = 1; one of the two ﬁrms has of already observed its
26Note that here, unlike the previous sections, we say that parties renegotiate (and not bargain) their
contract at time t = 1: In fact, we refer to bargaining as the attempt to reach a settlement when the initial
contract is “incomplete” and does not specify a termination clause: For this reason here we prefer to use the
word “renegotiation”.
16private valuation of the the asset A; then parties do not renegotiate their NC-contract. In
particular, we assume that at the time of renegotiation three events might have occurred:
(i) with probability ¸
2 ﬁrm 1 only observed its private valuation of the asset (either '1 = 0;
'1 = 'H or '1 = 'L), (ii) with probability ¸
2 ﬁrm 2 only observed its private valuation of
the asset (either '2 = 0; '2 = 'H or '2 = 'L), (iii) with probability (1 ¡ ¸) neither ﬁrm
observed its private valuation of the asset, where ¸ is positive but inﬁnitely small.
We assume that the renegotiation is as follows. One of the two ﬁrms proposes to amend
the initial contract by including a termination clause. If the proposal is accepted, then the
new clause is enforced in case of termination. In case of rejection, the usual bargaining stage
follows when the partnership is terminated. We focus on simple renegotiation proposals that
induce eﬃcient termination and eﬃcient asset allotment; namely, the proposal is to include






at which the asset A can be acquired/sold in case of termination of the
partnership. Indeed, from Proposition 7 other proposals are, in turn, not renegotiation-proof.
Proposition 8 Suppose that there is a positive, inﬁnitely small probability that one ﬁrm
observes its private valuation of the asset between t = 0 and t = 1; then there is a Per-
fect Bayesian Equilibrium satisfying the divinity criterion D1 where the NC-contract is not
renegotiated eﬃciently.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for the above result is the following. Suppose that ﬁrm i proposes to include






for the asset. Then, according to the divinity criterion
D1, the receiver of the proposal believes that ﬁrm i has already observed that its evaluation
of the asset is 'i = 'H and, therefore, it rejects the proposal. Hence, no proposal is made
in equilibrium.
4.3 Generalizing Distribution and Cost Functions
The main result of the paper is that partners might exploit contract incompleteness in order
to mitigate the hold-up problem they face when investment is non-veriﬁable. In particular, in
Section 3 we have shown that, under speciﬁc assumptions about the probability and the cost
functions, the contract without a termination clause can outperform any ex-post eﬃcient
complete contract; that is, the beneﬁcial eﬀect of a larger incentive to invest might dominate
the ex-post ineﬃciency that an incomplete contract induces.
The aim of this section is to generalize our main result about the incentive eﬀect of a
contract without termination clause. We provide suﬃcient and reasonable conditions that
ensure that an incomplete contract induces larger investment levels than a complete one.
Suppose that sv ¡
E[']
2 > 0 and (1 ¡ s)v ¡
E[']
2 > 0 so that each ﬁrm prefers the success of
the joint project to its failure. Moreover, suppose that the probability of success is increas-
ing in ki; i = 1;2 and that ﬁrms beneﬁt of weak complementarities in their investments:
the marginal productivity of the investment is (weakly) increasing and its marginal cost is
(weakly) decreasing in the partner’s investment, that is,
@p(k1;k2)
@k1@k2 ¸ 0 and
@2ci(k1;k2)
@k1@k2 · 0 for
17i = 1;2. Then, the investment game is a supermodular game with positive spillovers (ﬁrms’
pay-oﬀs are increasing in the level of partner’s investment) and therefore it is possible to ex-
ploit existence and comparative statics results for this kind of games. In particular, for such
games a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies always exists and the largest equilibrium, that
is the Nash equilibrium such that the level of investments are highest, is the Pareto preferred
one. Assuming that partners are able to coordinate to the Pareto preferred Nash equilibrium,
then it follows that the equilibrium investment levels are increasing in the ex-post costs of
litigation. The following proposition summarizes the previous discussion.
Proposition 9 Suppose that
@p(k1;k2)
@ki > 0 for i = 1;2; sv ¡
E[']




@k1@k2 ¸ 0 and
@2ci(k1;k2)
@k1@k2 · 0 for i = 1;2, then the investment levels that ﬁrms choose in
the Pareto preferred Nash equilibrium is increasing in the cost of litigation.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Obviously, given that only under an incomplete contract there is ex-post litigation, then
Proposition 9 generalizes our main result; that is:
Corollary 3 The investment levels that ﬁrms choose in the Pareto preferred Nash equilib-
rium is larger in case of a contract without termination clause than in case of an ex-post
eﬃcient complete contract.
5 Discussion
This paper shows that an ex-post veriﬁcation mechanism, like a Court, can be used as
an ex-ante incentive device in order to reduce the hold-up problem faced in a partnership,
when individual investments are not veriﬁable (in their quality, amount, or other relevant
characteristics). In order to be a credible device, the ex-post veriﬁcation mechanism has to be
sustained by the presence of asymmetric information regarding the object to be veriﬁed (in
our case, the value of the asset). Proposition 3 proves, in fact, that in presence of asymmetric
information on the value of the commonly owned asset, partners go to Court with positive
probability. Litigation in front of a Court generates a cost which decreases the value of the
partnership in case of failure. Therefore it increases the ex-ante incentive to exert eﬀort
(i.e. to devote higher quality or larger amount of investments) in order to make the alliance
successful (Proposition 5). Finally , alternative ways to increase investment incentives trough
ex-post ineﬃciencies are not renegotiation proof. as shown in Proposition 7.
In the remaining part of this section, we discuss some of the assumptions we made all
through the paper.
Unbounded Penalties
In Section 3.2.2 we assumed that ﬁrm 1 can only make simple oﬀers in the bargaining
stage: a price ¼ to buy the asset. In principle, ﬁrm 1’s proposals might be more sophisticated.
Let (ˆ '1;¼;®;L) be ﬁrm 1’s proposal at the bargaining stage, where ˆ '1 is the asset value that
ﬁrm 1 announces, ¼ is the price for asset, ® is the probability to go to Court, and L is a
18penalty paid by ﬁrm 1 to ﬁrm 2 in case the Court veriﬁes that ˆ '1 6= '1: If the penalty L is
suﬃciently large, then there exists an equilibrium in which ﬁrm 1 sets ¼ =
'1
2 and announces
the true state of the world, ﬁrm 2 accepts the proposal and therefore parties litigate in front
of the Court with probability ®: The possibility of using penalties in the bargaining stage
makes the contract without termination clause a less eﬀective device, even though it can be
shown that ® can be set equal to 0 only if L goes to inﬁnity, in order to have the truthful
revelation equilibrium. Nevertheless, contracts with large penalties are not always feasible,
for instance when ﬁrms have limited liability. Moreover, in many legislations such contracts
are not enforceable in front of a Court, even though there exists a huge debate in the law
and economics literature about the rationales for such limitation to the will of parties (see
for instance the seminal works on liquidated damages by Shavell, 1980 and Rogerson, 1984
and for more recent contributions Aghion and Hermalin, 1990, Chung, 1992 and Che and
Chung, 1999). With respect to this point, one may also interpret the result of our paper
as a further argument that rationalizes the non-enforceability of unbounded penalties. Very
large penalties reduce the frequency of ex-post litigation, but a certain amount of litigation
is a useful discipline device to reduce the hold-up problem, and therefore having bounded
penalties may turn out to be ex-ante eﬃcient.
Bargaining and Court’s Rules
In the paper we assumed that the ﬁrm which observes the value of the asset makes a
proposal to its partner in order to reach an amicable agreement. In a previous version of the
paper we show that litigation occurs with positive probability even if the non-informed party
makes the proposal (see, Comino et al., 2004); therefore the incomplete contract enhances
the investment incentives also in this case.
In Section 3.2.2, we assumed that, in order to allot the legal expenses, Courts adopt a fee-
shifting rule based on the bargaining proposals. As said, these rules make easier for parties
to reach an amicable settlement without resorting to Court and therefore strengthen our
result. Many other rules may be taken into consideration. For instance, we could consider
a two-sided rule which charges all legal expenses to the proposer of an unfair price oﬀer, or
to the party which rejects a fair one. Alternatively, we could employ the “American rule”
according to which legal expenses are always split equally. It can be shown that in all these
cases the one described in Proposition 3 is still an equilibrium even though other equilibria
may arise. However, our main argument generally holds: litigation in front of the Court
occurs in all equilibria.
Asset Value
All through the paper we assumed that the value of the asset A and that of the successful
project v do not depend on the investment levels chosen by the partners, but rather they
are exogenously determined. Proposition 9 can be further generalized showing that if the
investment levels weakly increase v;(or more in general the diﬀerence v ¡ E[']); then the
investment game is supermodular and therefore Corollary 3 still holds..
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Suppose that the partnership has been terminated and call i the ﬁrm that has been selected







always eﬃciently allotted (assuming that if a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between two actions it takes
the eﬃcient one); in fact, if 'i > 0; then ﬁrm i prefers to be the buyer rather than the seller
since 'k ¡ b ¸ b for both k 2 fH;Lg (note that if b =
'L
2 type 'L is indiﬀerent and we
assume that it chooses to be the buyer, that is we assume that in case of indiﬀerence a ﬁrm
takes the eﬃcient action). If 'i = 0; then ﬁrm i prefers to be the seller since b ¸ ¡b: Suppose
22that b >
'L
2 : when 'i > 0; since 'L ¡ b < b; then type 'L ineﬃciently prefers to be the
seller. Hence, there is not always an eﬃcient allotment of the asset in case of termination.¥
Proof of Lemma 2:
From Section 3 we know that eﬃciency requires continuation of the partnership in case
µ = µG and termination in case µ = µB: Consider case (i) in the text of the Lemma; ﬁrm
1 decides to continue the partnership when µ = µG provided that: (1) sv ¸ 'H ¡ b; this
ensures continuation in case '1 > 0; and (2) sv ¸ b; this ensures continuation in case '1 = 0:






, (1) implies (2). Moreover, ﬁrm 1 always chooses to terminate
the partnership when µ = µB since, by Lemma 1, it obtains b ¸ 0 in case '1 = 0 and
'1 ¡ b > 0 in case '1 > 0 rather than a pay-oﬀ of 0 that it would obtain by continuing
the partnership. A similar argument applies for case (ii) when ﬁrm 2 has the unilateral
right to decide upon termination/continuation of the partnership. In case (iii) the eﬃcient
continuation/termination decision is always taken provided that: (a) none of the ﬁrms wants
to terminate the partnership when µ = µG; and (b) at least one ﬁrm wants to terminate the
partnership when µ = µB: From the analysis of cases (i) and (ii) we know that (a) is veriﬁed







implies that both ﬁrm prefer termination when µ = µB: In case (iv) an eﬃcient
continuation/termination decision is always taken provided that: (a) at least one of the ﬁrms
wants to continue the partnership when µ = µG; and (b) both ﬁrms want to terminate the
partnership when µ = µB: Condition v > 'H ensures that condition (a) is always veriﬁed;
indeed, consider the case '1 > 0 and '2 = 0; then at least one of the following conditions
sv ¸ 'H ¡ b, (1 ¡ s)v ¸ b is veriﬁed so that there is continuation. A similar argument
applies for the alternative case '1 = 0 and '2 > 0: Finally, as for cases (i) and (ii) discussed






implies that both ﬁrms prefer to terminate the partnership
when µ = µB so that condition (b) is always met. ¥
Proof of Proposition2
Consider an ex-post eﬃcient contract fs;d;b;fg: From Lemma 1 we know that in case of
µ = µB ﬁrm i = 1;2 obtains (E['] ¡ b) if 'i > 0 and b if 'i = 0: Therefore, when choosing
the investment level it solves
max
ki















where, ¾1 = s and ¾2 = 1 ¡ s:






, thus the optimal investment










otherwise. The investment game has a
unique equilibrium but depending on the selected values for ¾1 and ¾2 it can have diﬀerent
characteristics: (i) only one ﬁrm makes a positive investment or (ii) both ﬁrms make a
positive investment. It can be shown that, due to the convexity of the cost function, for any
23equilibrium of type (i) there is equilibrium of type (ii) which is more eﬃcient. Therefore we
consider values of ¾1 and ¾2 such that both ﬁrms are induced to invest.
The (ex-ante) eﬃcient share of the monetary values solves
max



























Straightforward calculations show that the s = 1
2 solves the above program; plugging this





Proof of Proposition 3.
The proof is in three steps. First, we show the strategy proﬁle stated in Proposition 3 is an
equilibrium. Second, we show that the out of equilibrium beliefs satisfy the divinity criterion
D1. Finally, we show that there are no other equilibria of the bargaining game that satisfy
the divinity criterion D1. Recall that we refer to 1 as the ﬁrm for which the asset has a






















¡ F (1 ¡ ¯) ¡ "
since the proposal is accepted with probability ¯ and rejected otherwise. Any other proposal
smaller than
'H
2 is rejected and it is therefore dominated by ¼ =
'L
2 . Making “no oﬀer”,
type 'L obtains
'L
2 ¡ F, which is less than what it obtains in equilibrium provided that
" is small enough. Any proposal ¼ ¸
'H
2 is accepted by ﬁrm 2 but it is dominated since
'H ¡ 'L ¸ 2F(1 ¡ ¯) + 2":
Type 'H of ﬁrm 1. The proposal ¼ =
'H
2 is accepted and ensures a pay-oﬀ of
'H
2 ¡ ". The
proposal ¼ =
'L





) + (1 ¡ ¯)(
'H
2
¡ 2F) ¡ ":
Type 'H is indiﬀerent between proposals ¼ =
'H
2 and ¼ =
'L
2 provided that ﬁrm 2 accepts
the second proposal with probability ¯ = 4F




2 is dominated by ¼ =
'H
2 ; similarly, also making “no oﬀer” at all is dominated by
¼ =
'H
2 provided that " < F.
Firm 2. Accepting any ¼ ¸
'H
2 is optimal since its rejection ensures at most
'H
2 . Consistently
with its beliefs, to reject any
'L
2 < ¼ <
'H
2 and any ¼ <
'L
2 is optimal for ﬁrm 2 since in this
24way it obtains
'H
2 from the Court. When receiving a proposal ¼ =
'L
2 , ﬁrm 2 believes that the
proposer is of type 'H with probability ®
1+® and of type 'L with probability 1
1+®. Therefore,











that is when ® = 2F
'H¡'L: It can be easily veriﬁed that ® 2 (0;1) provided that 'H¡'L ¸ 2F.
2 Divinity criterion D1. First note that for any oﬀer ¼ <
'L
2 to accept the proposal is a
strictly dominated strategy. Similarly for any oﬀer ¼ >
'H
2 to accept is a strictly dominant
strategy and therefore beliefs over the proposer’s type are irrelevant.
Consider any oﬀer ¼ such that
'L
2 < ¼ <
'H
2 . Let ½ denote the probability that ﬁrm 2
accepts the oﬀer ¼: Type 'H prefers to make such an oﬀer than playing according to the







2 ¡ ", that is
½ ¸
4F
'H ¡ 2¼ + 4F
´ ¯ ½H:












2 ¡F(1¡¯)¡". First, note that if ¼ >
'L
2 +F;
the intuitive criterion ensures that ﬁrm 2 has to assign probability one that the proposer is
type 'H: For any
'L
2 < ¼ ·
'L
2 + F we have
½ ¸
2¯F
'L ¡ 2¼ + 2F
´ ¯ ½L:
One can verify that ¯ ½H < ¯ ½L : in fact, substituting ¯ = 4F
4F+('H¡'L) and denoting ¼ =
'L
2 + z with 0 < z · F; after some manipulations the condition turns to be equal to ¡
2F + 'H ¡ 'L¢
z > 0; which holds true. Therefore only the out of equilibrium beliefs
stated in the Proposition satisfy the divinity criterion D1.
3 Uniqueness.
To prove that there are no other equilibria of the bargaining game that satisfy the divinity
criterion D1 we need to check all possible equilibria: separating, pooling and semi-separating.
Let ¼k denote the proposal made by type k 2 fH;Lg of ﬁrm 1.
A. Separating equilibria
A1 the two types of ﬁrm 1 make two diﬀerent oﬀers: by deﬁnition of separating equilibrium
it has to be ¼H 6= ¼L. Moreover, ﬁrm 2 has to accept both oﬀers otherwise the type
whose oﬀer is rejected would prefer to make “no proposal” and save ". However, the
proposed one cannot be an equilibrium since the type whose equilibrium oﬀer is the
largest prefers to deviate and mimic the other type;
25A2 type 'H makes “no proposal” while type 'L proposes ¼L: in such an equilibrium ¼L
has to satisfy the following conditions: ¼L ¸
'L
2 , otherwise the proposal is rejected
and type 'L is better-oﬀ making “no proposal”; ¼L ·
'L
2 + F ¡ ", otherwise type 'L
prefers to make “no proposal”. However, this cannot be an equilibrium since type 'H
prefers to propose ¼L rather than to make “no proposal”;
A3 type 'L makes “no proposal” while type 'H proposes ¼H: in such an equilibrium it has
to be ¼H =
'H
2 . Indeed, ¼H reveals that ﬁrm 1 is of type 'H and ﬁrm accepts if and
only if ¼H ¸
'H
2 . Given this fact, it is optimal for type 'H to propose
'H
2 . Moreover,
for this to be an equilibrium, ﬁrm 2 has to reject any oﬀer smaller than
'H
2 . This is
the case provided that ﬁrm 2 assigns a positive probability to type 'H when observing
a proposal ¼ <
'H








that the divinity criterion D1 imposes that ¹(˜ ¼) = 0: Hence given these beliefs ﬁrm
2 should accept proposal ¼ and type 'L would be better-oﬀ oﬀering such a ¼ rather







and let ½ be the
probability that ﬁrm 2 accepts the proposal. The minimal probability for which type
'H prefers to make such a proposal rather than oﬀering
'H
2 according to the separating







2 ¡ ", or:
½ ¸
4F
'H ¡ 2˜ ¼ + 4F
´ ¯ ½H:
The minimal probability for which type 'L prefers to oﬀer ˜ ¼ rather than, as required











'L ¡ 2˜ ¼ + 2F
´ ¯ ½L:
For " small enough it follows that ¯ ½L < ¯ ½H: Hence the divinity criterion D1 imposes
¹(˜ ¼) = 0.
B. Semi-separating equilibria
As ﬁrst we prove that we can have a semi-separating equilibrium only in the case in which
type 'H randomizes between two diﬀerent proposals and type 'L makes only a proposal.
Then we prove that within this class of equilibria only the one stated in Proposition 3 survives
to the scrutiny of the divinity criterion D1.
B1 There exists no equilibrium in which type 'H plays “no oﬀer” with strictly positive
probability: making no oﬀer type 'H obtains
'H
2 ¡ F. This is a dominated strategy
since an oﬀer
'H
2 is accepted by ﬁrm 2 and guarantees a pay-oﬀ
'H
2 ¡ " to type 'H;
B2 There exists no equilibrium in which type 'L plays “no oﬀer” with strictly positive
probability: to check that this claim is true we need to consider two cases:
26² type 'L plays “no oﬀer” with probability 1. This cannot be the case since (by
deﬁnition of semi-separating) this implies that type 'H plays mixed strategies
randomizing between “no oﬀer” and some oﬀer ¼. However, this cannot be true
by what we have proven in the previous point B1;
² type 'L plays mixed strategies randomizing between“no oﬀer” and an oﬀer ¼.





2 + F ¡ "
i
since otherwise “no oﬀer” would dom-
inate ¼. Type 'L is indiﬀerent between playing “no oﬀer” and ¼ if the latter
oﬀer is accepted by ﬁrm 2 with probability ¯ such that
'L










¡ ", that is ¯ = "
'L+2F¡2¼. In a semi-separating equilib-
rium type 'H should make the same oﬀer ¼ as type 'L. However, it is easy
to check that type 'H prefers oﬀering
'H
2 rather than ¼; indeed
'H










¡" if and only if 4F > "
'L+2F¡2¼
¡
'H + 4F ¡ 2¼
¢
which is certainly true for " small enough.
B3 There exists no equilibrium in which type 'L plays mixed strategies randomizing be-
tween any ¼ and ¼ + ±. Suppose that type 'L plays mixed strategies randomizing
between ¼ and ¼ + ±. Clearly it has to be that ¼ ¸
'L
2 and ¼ + ± ·
'L
2 + F ¡ " since
any other strategy is dominated. We need to distinguish the following sub-cases:
² type 'H oﬀers ¼. The oﬀer ¼ + ± reveals that ﬁrm 1 is of type 'L and therefore
it is accepted by ﬁrm 2. Therefore, type 'L is indiﬀerent between ¼ and ¼ + ± if
and only if the former oﬀer is accepted by ﬁrm 2 with probability ¯ and rejected










that is, ¯ =
'L+2(F¡±¡¼)
'L¡2(¼¡F) . Given this ¯ it is easy to verify that type 'H prefers










¡ ") if and only if
³
'H
2 ¡ ¼ + 2F
´
(1 ¡ ¯) + ± > 0 which is surely
veriﬁed.
² type 'H oﬀers ¼ + ±. This cannot be the case since in equilibrium ¼ would be
oﬀered only by type 'L and would be accepted by ﬁrm 2. Therefore, both types
of ﬁrm 1 prefer oﬀering ¼ with probability 1.
² type 'H plays mixed strategies. First note that the two types have to randomize
over the same support. On the contrary both types would be making at least one
oﬀer that reveals their own types and all such proposals should be accepted with
probability one. But then this cannot be an equilibrium since there exists one
type who should deviate oﬀering the smallest revealing oﬀer. Consider, hence, the
case in which type 'H randomizes between ¼ and ¼+±. The proposed equilibrium
has to be sustained by the following beliefs: for any e ¼ 2 (¼;¼ + ±), ¹(˜ ¼) > 0.
Indeed, if this is not the case then both types prefer to deviate and make such
oﬀer instead of oﬀering ¼ + ±. Call Ã the probability that ﬁrm 2 accepts the
27equilibrium oﬀer ¼ + ± and consider an out of equilibrium oﬀer ¼ + ± ¡ °, with
0 < ° < ±. Type 'L is willing to make such oﬀer provided that it is accepted at
least with probability ½ such that
½
¡
'L ¡ ¼ ¡ ± + °
¢
+ (1 ¡ ½)(
'L
2 ¡ F) ¸ Ã
¡
'L ¡ ¼ ¡ ±
¢






Similarly, type 'H is willing to oﬀer ¼+±¡° provided that ½
¡





2 ¡ 2F) ¸ Ã
¡
'H ¡ ¼ ¡ ±
¢





. Using the standard
arguments it can be shown that the divinity criterion D1 imposes to assign ¹(˜ ¼) =
0 when ¼ + ± ¡ ° is oﬀered.
Finally, we have to check the case where type 'H plays mixed strategies while type 'L
plays pure strategies. Obviously it has to be that one oﬀer is made by both types and another
oﬀer is made by type 'H only. In equilibrium the latter oﬀer has to be
'H
2 . Moreover, the
oﬀer which is made by both types has to be no smaller than
'L
2 to be accepted by ﬁrm 2.
Let’s denote
'L
2 + ∆ the oﬀer which is made by the two types. Note that, the case ∆ = 0
coincides with the equilibrium in Proposition 3 and therefore we restrict the attention to the
case of ∆ > 0.





the former oﬀer is accepted with probability ¯ = 4F
4F¡2∆+('H¡'L) and rejected otherwise.
Moreover, these oﬀers are equilibrium strategies if ﬁrm 2 assigns ¹(¼) > 0 when receiving
'L
2 +∆¡° for 0 < ° < ∆. However, in what follows we show that such beliefs do not satisfy
the divinity criterion D1.
Type 'H prefers oﬀering
'L
2 +∆¡° rather than
'H




















2 ¡ ∆ + ° + 2F
´ ¯ ½H:
Type 'L prefers oﬀering
'L
2 + ∆ ¡ ° rather the equilibrium oﬀer
'L





¡ ∆ + °
¶












+ (1 ¡ ¯)(
'L
2
¡ F) ¡ "
that is, if:
½ ¸
4F (F ¡ ∆)
(4F ¡ 2∆ + ('H ¡ 'L))(F ¡ ∆ + °)
´ ¯ ½L:
It can be easily shown that ¯ ½H > ¯ ½L given that 2F +('H¡'L) > 0 and therefore the divinity
criterion D1 imposes ¹(¼) = 0 when ¼ + ∆ ¡ ° is oﬀered.
C. Pooling equilibria





2 is accepted by ﬁrm 2 and guarantees type 'H a pay-oﬀ
'H
2 ¡ ".























2 ): Consider that ﬁrm 1 makes
an out of equilibrium oﬀer ˜ ¼ = ¼¡". To sustain ¼ as a pooling equilibrium, ﬁrm 2 has
to assign probability ¹(˜ ¼) > 0. However, the divinity criterion D1 imposes ¹(˜ ¼) = 0
and with such beliefs the one proposed cannot be an equilibrium because both types of
ﬁrm 1 prefer to deviate. Consider type 'L. It prefers to oﬀer ˜ ¼ rather than ¼ provided




L ¡ ˜ ¼
¢






¡ " ¸ '
L ¡ ¼ ¡ "
that is:
½ ¸
'L ¡ 2¼ + 2F
'L ¡ 2˜ ¼ + 2F
´ ½L:




H ¡ ˜ ¼
¢






¡ " ¸ '
H ¡ ¼ ¡ "
that is:
½ ¸
'H ¡ 2¼ + 4F
'H ¡ 2˜ ¼ + 4F
´ ½H:
It can be veriﬁed that ¯ ½L < ¯ ½H provided that "
¡
'H ¡ 'L + 2F
¢
> 0 which follows by
assumption.
Both types of ﬁrm 1 play mixed strategies randomizing between no oﬀer and ¼. Firm
2 is not willing to accept any oﬀer smaller than
'L
2 while type 'L does not make any oﬀer
larger than
'L
2 + F ¡ ". Given that the oﬀer has to satisfy these restrictions, then type
'L is indiﬀerent between oﬀering ¼ and making “no oﬀer” provided that ¼ is accepted with











2 ¡ F, that is provided
that Ã = 2"
'L¡2¼+2F ´ ÃL. Similarly, type 'H is indiﬀerent between oﬀering ¼ and making











2 ¡ F, that is provided that Ã0 =
2("+F)
'H¡2¼+4F ´ ÃH. Therefore, the
proposed one can be an equilibrium only when ÃH = ÃL and this is not true for " > 0 small
enough. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4
In case µ = µB; ﬁrm i = 1;2 is the buyer ('i > 0) or the seller ('i = 0) of the asset





2 ¡F (1 ¡ ¯)¡" respectively, as deﬁned in Proposition 3; therefore ﬁrm i = 1;2 anticipates

















F (1 ¡ ¯)
2
¡ ":
In turn, in case ﬁrm i is the seller of the asset it obtains
'L





2 (1 ¡ ®) when the partner has observed 'H, as deﬁned in Proposition 3;





























When choosing ki ﬁrm i = 1;2 solves the following maximization problem:





























Q ´ E['] ¡
µ











thus the optimal investment level of ﬁrm i is:
ki (¾i) =
(










The investment game has a unique equilibrium but depending on the selected values for ¾1
and ¾2 it can have diﬀerent characteristics: (i) only one ﬁrm makes a positive investment
or (ii) both ﬁrms make a positive investment. It can be shown that, due to the convexity
of the cost function, for any equilibrium of type (i) there is equilibrium of type (ii) which is
more eﬃcient. Therefore we consider values of ¾1 and ¾2 such that both ﬁrms are induced
to invest.
The (ex-ante) eﬃcient share of the monetary values solves
max
s
´ [k1 (s) + k2 (1 ¡ s)]v+
















2 [k2 (1 ¡ s)]
2
Direct calculations show that the sNC = 1
2 solves the above program; plugging this value
of s into the expressions of the ﬁrms’ investment one obtains that in case of an (ex-ante)
















Proof of Proposition 6
In the contract with the termination clause ﬁrms’ problem is:
max
ki
















(1 + ±kj)´ ¡ °ki = 0
for i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j
and solving the system of the two ﬁrst order conditions we obtain:
ki = ´ (E ['] ¡ 2v¾i)
2° ¡ ±´E ['] + 2±v´¾j ¡
E [']
2 + 4v2¾1¾2 ¡ 2vE ['](¾1 + ¾2)
¢
±2´2 ¡ 4°2
for i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j:
(1)
By direct computation, considering that ¾1 = s and ¾2 = 1 ¡ s, the maximization of the
joint proﬁts yields s = 1
2. In fact the joint proﬁt can be written as:











and considering that the two ki’s are symmetric with respect to ¾i and ¾j, one obtains the
result. Substituting s = 1









; i = 1;2
which for ± = 0, that is kC (0), is identical to that found in Proposition 2 and it is increasing in
±. Therefore we already proved point 1) of the proposition for the contract with termination









In the contract without the termination clause ﬁrms’ problem is:
max
ki























(1 + ±kj)´ ¡ °ki = 0
for i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j

























´; i = 1;2
By direct calculations, also in this case, the ﬁrst order condition for s is satisﬁed in s = 1
2,
considering that ¾1 = s, ¾2 = 1¡s, and furthermore Q1 = Q2 and k1 = k2 for s = 1
2 = ¾1 =







v ¡ E ['] +
F(1¡¯)








v ¡ E ['] +
F(1¡¯)
2 + " + ®
4 ('H ¡ 'L)
i
±
which for ± = 0, that is kNC
i (0), is identical to that found in Proposition 4 and it is increasing










Moreover, we have that:
k
NC














i (0) ¡ kC
i (0)
(1 ¡ kNC
i (0)±)(1 ¡ kC
i (0)±)
> 0
since we already proved that kNC
i (0) ¡ kC























therefore the investment with the incomplete contract is always higher, it increases with
± at a higher rate and therefore point 2 of the proposition is proven. We now have to
32compare the two proﬁt levels. In the case of contract with termination clause and after some
manipulations, the equilibrium proﬁts are:






































i (0) and recalling the deﬁnition of kC






















































While the corresponding in the case of the contract with no termination clause are:
































v ¡ E['] +






















E ['] ¡ " ¡
1
2













i (0) and the deﬁnition of kNC
i (0) we can transform












v ¡ E['] +




































































































¤2 [3 ¡ 2±x] ¡ x
(5)
By deﬁnition, for ± = 0, the above condition is identical to that in Proposition 5. Therefore






4F + 'H ¡ 'L +
2°
3´2 (6)
(5) is satisﬁed. Now we have to prove what happens as ± increases and in particular we wish
















2 + 6 ¡ 4x±
¢
> 0
where the two inequalities are implied by the fact that in equilibrium we must have kNC
i (0) >
0, whose necessary condition is 1 ¡ ±kNC
i (0) > 0, and hence 1 ¡ x± > 0. Therefore G(¢)
increases with ± and increases at increasing rate if also x increases. But we know that
kNC
i (0) ¸ kC
i (0), therefore (5) is more easily satisﬁed when ± increases.























i (0) we substituted the equilibrium values of ® and ¯. There are parameters
which enter only in kNC












Therefore G is a continuous function (since we need to impose 1 ¡ x± > 0) and convex in
x. It is diﬃcult, though, to determine the sign the ﬁrst derivative. Notice however that if
@
@xG(x;0) · 0 for x = kNC
i (0), then the derivative would be negative for all values before













but we know that this is false for (6). Hence, for this condition we must have: @
@xG(x;0) > 0
for x = kNC
i (0). Finally recall that @2
@±@xG(x;±) > 0 therefore @
@xG(x;±) > 0 for any ± > 0.
34This implies that an increase (decrease) of all those parameter which make kNC
i (0) increase
(decrease), but leave kC





8F 2 + 4F('H ¡ 'L) + ('H ¡ 'L)2







(4F + 'H ¡ 'L)
2 > 0
and therefore the comparative statics for these parameters is the same as in the model with
no complementarity, ± = 0. For the parameters which inﬂuence both kC
i (0) and kNC
i (0)
notice that convexity implies:
G(x + ∆;±) ¡ G(x;±) > G(y + ∆;±) ¡ G(y;±) if x > y (7)
which in turn implies:
G(x + ∆
0;±) ¡ G(x;±) > G(y + ∆;±) ¡ G(y;±) if x > y and ∆
0 > ∆ (8)
Recalling the deﬁnitions of kC
i (0) and kNC
i (0), there are four parameters which inﬂuence
both: v;E ['];° and ´. A change in the ﬁrst two (an increase in v and a decrease in E [']),
induces the same increase in absolute value of two investment levels, therefore (7) applies
and (5) is reinforced. A change of ° and ´ (an increase of ´ and a decrease of °) induces a
proportional increase of kC
i (0) and kNC
i (0). This implies that the latter (which is bigger)
increases more than the former. Therefore (8) applies and (5) is again reinforced. Hence
the comparative statics for ° parameters is the same as in the model where ± = 0. ´ enters
also in the deﬁnition of G. However it is easy to check that an increase in ´ reinforces (5)
even holding kC
i (0) and kNC
i (0) constant. Therefore also for ´ the comparative statics is
unchanged with respect to the model with ± = 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7




: We distinguish between two cases, according to whether the ineﬃciency
occurs when µ = µB or µ = µG.
Case 1: Ineﬃcient decisions when µ = µB.We consider two sub-cases: contracts with an
ineﬃcient allotment of the asset A and contracts with ineﬃcient continuation of the part-
nership.
1.1 Contracts with an ineﬃcient allotment of the asset A
An ineﬃcient allotment of the asset occurs whenever the asset is not assigned to ﬁrm 1.
Consider the case where b ¸ 0: Note ﬁrst that in this case an ineﬃcient allotment of A might
occur only when the buy/sell decision is taken by ﬁrm 1 since ﬁrm 2 always chooses to sell
A: Therefore, we consider the case in which ﬁrm 1 has been selected to choose whether to
buy or to sell the asset. Two cases are possible:
351. b >
'H
2 ;both types of ﬁrm 1 prefer to sell the asset given that 'k ¡ b < b for both
k = fH;Lg. The expected pay-oﬀ of ﬁrm 1 is b while that of ﬁrm 2 is ¡b: In this case
the contract can be eﬃciently renegotiated in the following way: ﬁrm 1 proposes to
set a new price ˆ b = ¡b: Provided that the proposal is accepted, then ﬁrm 1 buys the
asset and obtains 'k ¡ ˆ b > b for k = fH;Lg: Firm 2 is indiﬀerent between accepting
or rejecting the oﬀer and therefore accepting it is a best response.
2.
'L
2 < b ·
'H
2 ; type 'H is willing to buy the asset thus obtaining 'H ¡b while type 'L
is sells A thus obtaining b. The expected pay-oﬀ of ﬁrm 2 is 1
2 (b) + 1
2 (¡b) = 0 and
there is an ineﬃcient allotment of the asset with probability 1
2: The following proposal
is beneﬁcial for both ﬁrms and leads to an eﬃcient allotment of the asset: ﬁrm 1
proposes to set a new price ˆ b = 0: More precisely, the (pooling) equilibrium is such
that ﬁrm 1 oﬀers ˆ b = 0 independently of its type and ﬁrm 2 accepts this proposal.
Note that, independently of its beliefs, ﬁrm 2 rejects any renegotiation proposal ˆ b < 0.
Finally suppose that the initial contract speciﬁes a negative price for acquiring the
asset: b < 0: In this case there is ineﬃcient allotment of the asset whenever ﬁrm 2
takes the buy/sell decision. Indeed, ﬁrm 2 ineﬃciently buys the asset and the pay-oﬀ
of ﬁrm 1 and 2 is ¡b and b respectively. This contract can be eﬃciently renegotiated
in the following way: ﬁrm 1 propose ˆ f = 1; ˆ b = 0 and pays ¡b to ﬁrm 2 conditional
upon acceptance of the proposal.
1.2 Contracts with ineﬃcient continuation of the partnership
An ineﬃcient continuation of the partnership occurs whenever a ﬁrm which can veto the
termination of the partnership prefers to continue it when µ = µB.
1. Firm 2 prefers to continue the partnership. Suppose that ﬁrm 2 prefers to continue the
partnership once µ = µB occurred. Then both ﬁrms obtain 0: However, the contract
can be eﬃciently renegotiated in the following way: ﬁrm 1 proposes to include the
following termination clause: ˆ d = 1;ˆ b = 0 and ˆ f = 1: If the proposal is accepted, ﬁrm
1 terminates the partnership and buys the asset at price ˆ b = 0; therefore its expected
pay-oﬀ is 'k > 0 for both k = fH;Lg: Firm 2 is indiﬀerent between accepting or
rejecting the proposal and thus accepting is optimal.
2. Firm 1 prefers to continue the partnership. Consider that µ = µB occurred. We need
to consider two subcases.
(a) Both types of ﬁrm 1 prefer to continue the partnership (this happens for instance
when d = 1; b > 'H and f = 0) and then both ﬁrms expect to obtain 0: In
this case the initial contract can be eﬃciently renegotiated in the following way:
ﬁrm 1 proposes to include the following clause: ˆ d = 1;ˆ b = 0 and ˆ f = 1: If the
proposal is accepted, ﬁrm 1 terminates the partnership and buys the asset at the
price ˆ b = 0; therefore its expected pay-oﬀ is 'k for both k = fH;Lg: Firm 2 is
indiﬀerent between accepting or rejecting the proposal and thus accepting it is
optimal.
36(b) Only type 'L prefers to continue the partnership (this happens for instance when
d = 1; 'L < b · 'H and f = 0). In this case ﬁrm 2 expects to obtain b
2 and the
partnership is ineﬃciently continued with probability 1
2: The following proposal
by ﬁrm 1 eliminates this ineﬃciency: ˆ d = 1; ˆ b = b
2 and ˆ f = 1: More precisely,
the (pooling) equilibrium is the following. Independently of its type, ﬁrm 1 oﬀers
ˆ b = b
2; ﬁrm 2 accepts ˆ b = b
2 and any ˆ b ¸ b; and rejects otherwise. Firm 2
believes that ¹
³
ˆ b 6= b
2
´
= 1 and ¹
³




2. Consider ﬁrm 1: According to
the equilibrium it obtains a pay-oﬀ equal 'k ¡ b
2 ¡ " for k = fH;Lg. Oﬀering
ˆ b 6= b
2 cannot be part of the equilibrium, since either the proposal is rejected or it
is dominated by ˆ b = b
2: Making no proposal ﬁrm 1 obtains a pay-oﬀ equal to 0;if
it is of type 'L; or equal to 'H ¡ b < 'L; if it is of type 'H; where b is the price
of the asset A in the original ineﬃcient contract (which is greater than 'L). Both
payoﬀs are less than the equilibrium payoﬀ. Consider ﬁrm 2. Firm 2 is indiﬀerent
between accepting the proposal b
2; and rejecting it. Moreover, accepting any ˆ b ¸ b
is a dominant strategy. Finally, the equilibrium beliefs satisfy the D1 criterion. In
fact, let ½ denote the probability that the proposal is accepted. First note that to
oﬀer ˆ b > b is a dominated strategy for both types of ﬁrm 1; ¹
³




directly by the intuitive criterion if 'L < ˆ b · b: Consider any ˆ b · 'L; type 'H is
willing to make such an oﬀer if
½('
H ¡ˆ b) + (1 ¡ ½)('







Type 'L is willing to oﬀer ˆ b if
½('






Since ¯ ½H < ¯ ½L; the D1 criterion applies.
Case 2: Ineﬃcient decision when µ = µG occurred.
There is ineﬃciency at t = 1 once µ = µG occurred when the partnership is terminated
with some positive probability. There exists at least one case in which such a contract is
renegotiation-proof. Suppose that ﬁrm 1 has the unilateral right to terminate the partnership
(namely d = 1 or d = 1 _ 2), 'H ¡ b > sv and 'L ¡ b · sv: In this case type 'H chooses
termination and type 'L chooses continuation. This contract is renegotiation-proof. Indeed,
the contract could be eﬃciently renegotiated only if ﬁrm 2 would accept a lower share of the
37proﬁts in order to induce type 'H to continue the partnership. However it can be checked
that according to the divinity criterion D1, any proposal with a new share s0 < s is rejected
by ﬁrm 2 since it assigns probability one that the proposer is type 'L. Therefore whenever
ﬁrm 1 is of type 'H there is ineﬃcient termination when µ = µG occurred. Nevertheless, we
show that the contract deﬁned in Proposition 2 Pareto dominates any contract which induces
ineﬃcient termination with positive probability. Let ¿ the probability that the partnership
is continued when µ = µG and (1 ¡ ¿) the probability that it is terminated. In this latter
case the selling ﬁrm obtains b while the buyer obtains 'i ¡ b. As shown in the ﬁrst part
of this proof the contract either provides for an eﬃcient termination and allotment of the
asset or it is eﬃciently renegotiated when µ = µB: Suppose that parties wrote a contract
that induces ineﬃcient termination with probability (1 ¡ ¿) when µ = µG. Then ﬁrm 1 and
ﬁrm 2 choose k1 and k2 in order to maximize:
p(k1;k2)
µ

















































and check that k1 (s;¿)+k2 (s;¿) is increasing in ¿. This means that the overall investment
(and the probability of µ = µG) is largest if there is always eﬃcient continuation when µ = µG.
¥
Proof of Proposition 8
First we show that there exist a PBE in which the initial contract is not renegotiated; after-
words we show that the beliefs that support such equilibrium satisfy the divinity criterion
D1. Let Φi denote the type of ﬁrm i that has not observed its valuation of the asset and
Oi, Li, Hi denote the type of ﬁrm i that has observed that its valuation is 0, 'L and 'H
respectively and with i = 1;2. Without loss of generality, let ﬁrm 1 be the proposer during
the renegotiation stage. Firm 1 can make no proposal or it can propose to set a price r for








Firm 1 does not make any renegotiation proposal; type Φ2 of ﬁrm 2 rejects any renegotiation







27To prove formally this result we should specify what is the best response of types (0)2 ;(L)2 ;(H)2 when
receiving a proposal r: However, given that the probability that ﬁrm 2 has already observed its type is
inﬁnitely small what types (0)2 ;(L)2 ;(H)2 do is not relevant to characterize the equilibrium choice of ﬁrm
1.






is the probability that ﬁrm 2 is of type Φ2 conditional on the fact that ﬁrm 1 is of type
Φ1: Therefore, for ¸ inﬁnitely small the probability of acceptance tends to zero and type Φ1
prefers not to make a proposal in order to avoid the cost of making the proposal, ": The
same argument holds for types O1;L1 and H1. Consider ﬁrm 2. Given its beliefs, when it






type Φ2 expects to obtain r by accepting; by rejecting such
proposal it expects to obtain
'H
2 since in the ensuing signalling game it will face type H1
with probability 1. Therefore, rejecting r is optimal for type Φ2 given its beliefs.
Beliefs
We show now that ¹(H1=r) = 1 satisﬁes the divinity criterion D1.






which is accepted by ﬁrm 2 with probability
½ is a best response provided that:




















Consider what happens in case µ = µB: If ﬁrm 1 has made an oﬀer that has been accepted,
then it will buy the asset at the price r: If the proposal has been rejected, then ﬁrm 2 believes
that it faces type H1 and, in the ensuing bargaining, it will accept only oﬀers equal or larger
than
'H
2 : On the contrary, if type H1 does not make any oﬀer then, in case of µ = µB the
equilibrium of Proposition 3 follows. Rearranging the above inequality, type H1 is better-oﬀ
making a proposal provided that it is accepted with probability
½ ¸
2ˆ "
'H ¡ 2r + 2"
´ ½H1
where ˆ " = "
1¡p(k1;k2).






which is accepted by ﬁrm 2 with probability
½ is a best response provided that:


















¡ F (1 ¡ ¯) ¡ "
¶
:
Note that in this case if the proposal is rejected then in case of µ = µB, in the ensuing
bargaining game, type L1 does not make any oﬀer and ﬁrms litigate in front of the Court;
indeed, after rejecting the proposal ﬁrm 2 believes with probability 1 that it faces type H1
39and accepts only oﬀers equal or larger than
'H
2 : Rearranging the above inequality, type L1
is better-oﬀ making a proposal provided that it is accepted with probability
½ ¸
2(F¯ ¡ " + ˆ ")
'L ¡ 2r + 2F
´ ½L1






which is accepted by ﬁrm 2 with probability
½ is a best response provided that:
p(k1;k2)(sv) + (1 ¡ p(k1;k2))
µ









































In case µ = µB; if the proposal has been accepted, then ﬁrm 1 will sell the asset at the price
r; if the proposal has been rejected then type O1 knows that it is facing type L2 or type H2
with equal probability (note that, when making the renegotiation proposal type O1 knows
that it is facing type Φ1); therefore in case of rejection ﬁrms will play the bargaining game
speciﬁed in Proposition 3, where ﬁrm 1 is the ﬁrm that receives the proposal. Rearranging
the above inequality it can be shown that type O1 is better-oﬀ making a proposal provided
that it is accepted with probability
½ ¸
4ˆ "
4r ¡ 2E['] + ®('H ¡ 'L)
´ ½O1
Finally consider type Φ1: This type of ﬁrm 1 ignores the type of ﬁrm 2 that it is facing;
conditional upon the fact that ﬁrm 1 has not observed its type, then the probability that
ﬁrm 2 has already observed its type is ¸




. For ¸ inﬁnitely small then only what type Φ2 is relevant. Therefore, type Φ1 is
better-oﬀ making an oﬀer r which is accepted by ﬁrm 2 with probability ½ provided that:
































































































Consider what happens in case of µ = µB: When making the renegotiation proposal ﬁrm 1
ignores whether it will be the buyer or the seller of the asset. If the proposal is accepted, then
40with probability 1
2 ﬁrm 1 will be the buyer thus obtaining E[']¡r; and with probability 1
2 it
will be the seller thus obtaining 1
2: Similarly, in case of rejection of the proposal with equal
probability ﬁrm 1 will be the buyer or the seller of the asset; in the former case, ﬁrm 2 will
accept only proposals larger than
'H
2 while in the latter the two ﬁrms play the bargaining
game speciﬁed in Proposition 3 with ﬁrm 2 being the proposer. Finally, if no renegotiation
proposal is made, then the usual bargaining game of Proposition 3 is played with ﬁrm 1 and
ﬁrm 2 being the proposer with probability 1
2: Rearranging the above inequality, one obtains
that type Φ1 is willing to make a renegotiation proposal provided that ﬁrm 2 accepts it at
least with probability:
½ ¸
2(4ˆ " + F¯ ¡ ")
2F + 2" + ®('H ¡ 'L)
´ ¯ ½Φ1:
It is easy the verify that for " small enough ¯ ½H1 is smaller than ¯ ½L1and ¯ ½Φ1: Moreover,
¯ ½H1 < ¯ ½O1 provided that r < 1
8
¡
2'H + 4" + 2E['] ¡ ®
¡
'H ¡ 'L¢¢














Proof of Proposition 9
Consider the investment game. The utility that ﬁrm i = 1 or 2 obtains is ui (k1;k2;») =





¡ ci (k1;k2); where 1 > ¾i > 0 denotes the share
of the monetary value v assigned to ﬁrm i while » denotes the expected cost of litigation;
» is positive and bounded above when ﬁrms sign an incomplete contract and litigate with
positive probability if the project fails, as shown in Proposition 3 while it is zero in case of
a complete contract. The assumptions of Proposition 9 guarantee that
@ui(ki;k3¡1;»)
@ki@k3¡i ¸ 0 for
both i = 1;2 which, in turn, imply that investment game is supermodular and, therefore,





@ki > 0 and, then, it follows that the utility
function ui (ki;k3¡1;») has increasing diﬀerences in (ki;»): Therefore, by well-known results
on supermodular games (see Vives, 1999 for a review), since the investment game is a
supermodular game indexed by »; the largest (and the smallest) Nash equilibria are increasing






2 + ») > 0; then the investment
game is supermodular with positive spillovers, hence the largest Nash equilibrium is the
Pareto-preferred. ¥
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